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NEGATION AND CONTRADICTION
R. Routley and V. Routley
The problems of the meaning and function of negation are disentangled from
ontological issues with which they have been long entangled. TIle question of the
function of negation is the crucial issue separating relevant and paraconsist-
ent logics from classical theories. The function is illuminated by considering
the inferential role of contradictions, contradiction being parasitic on nega-
tion. Three basic modellings emerge: a cancellation model, which leads towards
connexivism, an explosion model, appropriate to classical and intuitionistic
theories, and a constraint model, which includes relevant theories. Thes three
modellings have been seriously confused in the modern literature: untangling
them helps motivate the main themes advanced concerning t radi tional negation
and natural negation. Firstly, the dominant traditional view, except around
scholastic t irres when the explosion view was in ascendency, has been the can-
cellation view, so that the mainstream negation of muchof traditional logic
is distincti v ly nonclassical. Secondly, the primary negation determinable of
natural negation is ·relevant negation. In order to picture relevant negation
the traditional idea of negation as otherthanness is progressivel) refined, to
nonexclus ive restricted otherthanness. Several pictures result, a reversal pic-
ture' a debate model, a record cabinet (or files of the universe) model which
help explain relevant negation. Two appendices are attached, one on negation
in Hegel and the ~hrxist tradition, the other on Wittgens ein's treatment of
negation and contradiction.
1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CENTRALITY OF NEGATION, AND THE HISTORICAL
ENTANGLEMENT OF NEGATION WITH ONTOLOGI CAL ISSUES.
Negation is a fundamental, but ill-lUlderstood, ill-explained and muchdis-
puted notion across a wide philosophical spectrum. It is not only the central
notion in recent and momentUl1l-gatheringdisputes between classically-inclined
logicians and alternative people (called by rougher classical types 'deviants9;
it is also, for instance, a crucial notion in muchBuddhist philosophy, such
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as theories of meaning, relation and cognition (see, e.g., Shaw, Matilal, and
references therein). But in order 'to make sense of the use of negation in Bui-
dhist philosophy in general, one needs to venture outside the perspective of
the standard (i.e. classical) notion of negation' (~atilal, p.2). As well, ne-
gation, along with its derivate nothingness, is a key notion in modem European
philosophy, for instance, in the modem tradition Sartre considers hi msel f to
belong to, from Hegel through Husserl and Heidegger (see Sartre, p.6 ff); again
the negations involved are, almost invariably, nonclassical.
Ilowever very many of the problems, accounted problems of negation in the
literature, are not real.l.y problems of negation simpliciter at all but are
rather problems of nonexi stence , which arise from the alleged riddle of not-
being or nonexistence; of how it can be truly said, as it sometimes is, that A
does not exist (or that A is not) when the truth of the statement implies that
!\ does exist (that A is). Such are central issues in Greek philosophy, from
Parncn idcs th rouoh Plato's Sophist; such are the main worries of late ninete-
enth and onr lv twent ie th century traditional logicians over negative judgements
and negative terms; such are many of the problems in existentialism over not-
being and nothingness. As to the second consider, for example, the main logi-
cal difficulties Joseph finds with negative judgements:
Judgement ... refers to the existent, whose manner of being
is as we conceive. But the real is positive: it only exists
by being something, not by being noVTIng.A negative judge-
ment declares what is not, and how can this express it as
it is?( 1)
/\5 to .the third, consider for instance Sartre' s (somewhat devious but similar)
'Irgul1ent to the objective existence of non-being and nothing (p.S) (2). All
thc sc moves and their difficulties, are based in one way or another upon the
Ontological As sumption, according to which what is a subject of true discourse
must exist, a thorough l y fallacious assumption whose manifold defects have aI-
. ready been exposed (in RoutIey , [22], Chapter 1).
These perennial "problems" persist in contemporary logical theory. Muchof
Russo11's problem with negation, for example, is again an ontological one:
if the SW1 is not shining there is not a fact sun-not-shin-
in:; which is aff i rmed by the true statement "the sun is not
shining" (p.S20).
For if there wcre , it would exist, yet how can such negativity exist? It can-
not .icco rd irig to Russel.l , in sharp contrast to existentialists, who grasp the
other h0111 of the dilemma the Ontological Assumption generates from negative
racts. Fort unatc Jy , Russell (erroneously) thinks, negation is eliminable: '
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"not" is unnecessary for a complete description of the wor l d' (p.S20). Hemakes
tIVOgestures towards showing this, one psychological and quite unsatisfactory
- 'what is happening [in the belief that "the sun is not shining"] is that I am
inhibiting the impulses generated by the belief that the sun is shining -and
one logical -' "not" is eliminated from our fundamental apparatus' through 'the
posi ti ve predicates "true" and "fal se'", But his is no elimination w i thout
cheating, namely reclassifying the negative predicate 'false' as a positive
predicate (which makes negation itself positive, since it can then be positive-
ly defined!). For, otherwise, as falsity involves negation, 'false' being de-
fined corrnnonly(for a very wide range of logical theories) in terms of 'true'
and 'not', the account Russell presupposes, that a statement not-A is true iff
A is false, is circular, and begs the question (cf. Quine, p.84). Similarly
the psychological account is circular at bottom, since 'inhibit' is a negative
verb (derived using the negative prefix 'in'). In fact the i.ndc Ei.nabiLity of
negation in various positive logics is readily demonstrated (see, e.g., God-
dard and Routley, chapter S). Negation cannot be eliminated without cheating:
nor can it be dispensed with without very serious impoverishment of discourse,
as Griss's attempt to constl~ct a negationless mathematics and von Dantzig's
an affirmative mathematics have revealed (see, e.g., Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel,
p.239 ff).
2. IT IS AS REGARDS NEGATION THAT RELEVANT AND PARACONSISTENT
LOGICS DIVERGE FUNDAMENTALLY FROM CLASSICAL LOGIC.
Even with the ontological problems duly disposed of, manyproblems remain,
especially as to the meaning and function of negation. Someof these problems
are grappled with in what follows, especially the problems of characterising,
picturing and modelling negations of relevant (and also paraconsistent) logics,
and, what overlaps these, negations of natural language. A relevant: logic can
be characterized, approximately for present purposes, as a logic whose pure
sentential part conforms to Belnap's weak relevance requirement, namely that
there is no thesis of the form A+ B, (i .e. that A implies or entails that B)
where A and B do not share a variable. (A standard relevant logic is one that
conservatively extends the first degree system FD, the first degree of system
E and R and very manyother relevant logics. MJchof the discussion of rele-
vant logic that fellows is conceived in terms of standard systems, though
SOIre points will apply more widely).
The fundaJrental divergence of relevant (and paraconsistent) logics from
classical logic is as to negation, its logical and inferential behaviour. In-
deed at 'the first degree stage (\vhere no nested implications occur), reLevant
and cLassicaL. logic differ just over negation (see Routley, Meyer, Plum"ood
and Brady, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals [23], hereafter RLR,Chapter 2).
Negation is accordingly, really the crucial notion for the choise of logical
theory, as also for comparisons of logical theories, for appreciation of the
varieties and character of competing theories of entailment, and so on.
Parasitic on negation is contradiction. A contradictory situation is one
where both B and -B (it is not the case that B) hold for some B. An explicit
contradiction is a statement of the form B and -B. A statement C is contradic-
tory, it is often said, if it entails both B and also -B for some R. etc. Con-
tradiction is always characterized in terms of negation and the logical behav-
iour of contradictions is dependent on that of negation. Different accounts of
negation result not merely in different conceptions of contradiction and of in-
compatibility, they likewise correspond to different accounts of what consti-
tutes a describable world, what constitutes a logically assessible world. Clas-
sical negation restricts such worlds to possible worlds, excluding contradic-
tory~d incomplete worlds.
Contradictory,situations playa prominent role in world semantics for rel-
evant logics. MJst conspicuously, nontrivial contradictory situations are de-
ployed in counterexamples to the harder Lewis paradox of implication, the
spread principle, ex falso quodlibet, A A -A -T B (or in rule form A, -A =l> B) ,
which spreads contradictions everywhere and trivializes all contradictory sit-
uations. For suppose c is a nontrivial situation, i.e. not everything holds at
c, but c is contradictory. Then for some A and B, A and -A both hold in c but
B does. not. Therefore A and -A does not entail B,' for this would require that
in whatever situation A and -A hold B does also.
It is at the same time evident that classical logic and classically-based
logics rule out nontrivial inconsistent situations, and so exclude an in~or-
tant class of theories, of much philosophical and other interest. MJre gener-
ally, the excluded class is that of paraconsistent theories. The core idea is
that a paraconsistent theory is one that contains true contradictions without
triviality. It is immediate that paraconsistent logics, logics that can serve
as the basis for paraconsistent theories are, rather radically, nonclassical.
Many relevant logics are paraconsistent logics, but not all are. For exam-
p Ie , Ackermann.' s logic II'(which has the same theorems as Anderson and Belnap's
system E) is not a paraconsistent logic; and similarly for almost any relevant
logic that has Material Detachment, A, -A v B -T B, as a primitive (or immediate)
rule. Systems E and R and all their subsystems and many of their extensions
are paraconsistent logics. Relevant logics do not however exhaust paraconsist-
ent logics. There are many irrelevant paraconsistent logics, e.g. the main
systems of da Costa, the earlier systems of Priest, etc. Relevant and para-
cons i stent logics thus properly ove rIap. Standard systems in the overlap are
of primary interest in what follows. For these systems a theory of negation,
of relevant negation, is especially important.
3. BASIC MOOELLINGS OF NEGATION IN TERMS OF DIFFERENT
RELATIONS OF -A TO A.
Theories of negation differ, very obviously, in the r~les they allow, or
assii(l1ito, contradictions. Contradictions may be al lowed no inferential role
(the)! iimply nothing, except perhaps themseIves ) , a total inferential role (they
imply everything), or some limited inferential role (they imply sene things,
such as their contradictory components, but not others). Th re are, correspord-
ingly three initial ways to classify theories of negation, i.n tern of the re-
latioT of -A to A.
1. _A deletes, neutralizes, erases, cancels A (and similarly, since the re-
lation is symmetrical, A erases -A), 50 that -A together wi th A leaves nothing,
no contcnt. The conjunction of A and -A says nothing, so nothing more specific
fo l l ows. In particular, AA -A does not entail A and does not entail -A. Accord-
ingly, the cancellation (erasure, or neutralization) model leads towards con-
ncxivi sm, a position (much discussed in RLR)distinguished by the following
two theses - First, that already cited, that explicit contradictions do not en-
tail thei r components, and secondly, that A does not entail -A. The second the-
sis cmergcs naturally under the neutralization view, for instance, as follows.
l nt ai Inc nt is inclusion of logical content. So, if Awere to entail _A, it
would include as part of its content, what neutralizes it, -A, in which event
it would entail nothing, having no content. So it is not the case that A en-
tails -A, that is Aristotle's thesis, -(A + -A) holds. (3)
lhere is reasonable, but not conclusive, evidence hat Aristotle did ad-
here to Aris tot Ie ' s thesis. And assuming that he did certainly has great ex-
plicative advantages, for example the full theory of the syllogism translates
into conncxive quantificati.onal logic without loss or qualification (as Angell,
~md also ~~Call, has pointed out); the theory of immediate inference also e-
nerge s intact (for inferential but not implicational form). Whether or not
AristOtle was operating with connexi ve assumptions, there is a long historical
linc of logicians and philosophers who have assumed a cancellation picture,
from Boeth ius in ncd.ieval times through to St rawson, Korner, and many others
in modem timcs (see RLR). One striking intermediate :~):arnpleis Berkeley, who
advances the following cl airns in his attack on the cal cul.us (The Analyst, p.
73) :
Nothing is plainer than that no just conclusion can be ~i-
rectly drawn from two inconsisten t prenuse s. You mayJJ1Geed
suppose any thing possible: But aftenoJards you may not sup-
pose anything that destroys what you f rst supposed: or, If
you do, you must begin de nove... [When]you... destroy one
suppos ition by another ... you may not ret.am the conse-
quences' OT any part of the consequences, of your fIrst sup-
pos i t ion so destroyed.
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Cancellation views are prevalent in one place where they are particularly
damaging,in so-called expositions of Hegel(but there is a basis for this ascrip-
tion in Hegel himself, as will appear). Given this phenomenonit is not surpris-
ing that Hegel's logic has appeared so intractable to commentators. Here, for
instance, is what the ~Brxist logician Havas has to say as regards Hegel's the-
ory:
... the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction is a gen-
eral principle of rretalogic, which can be said to bring out
a necessary condition to be satisfied by all human thought
and all of the systems of logic; namely, the condition that
it is a logical contradiction, and therefore, a logical mis-
take to assert both something and its opposite. This is one
of the elementary but necessary conditions of sound reason-
ing, because if one asserts something to be true and, insist-
ing on this assertion, one also asserts that this very as-
sertion is not true, then his assertions will neutralize
each other and, in consequence of this, no knOWledgewill
be acquired (p.?).
Apart from being unfaithful to Hegel, who (correctly) says that there is noth-
ing unth inkabIc about contradictions, thereby repudiating the laws-of-thoughtmyth,
and who accepted no such simple neutralization view, the Aristotelian principle
is not a metalogical principle concerning the logic of assertion.
The second nodeI for negation is that embodied in contemporary classical
and intuitionist logics:
2. -A explodes, or fully implodes, A (and similarly A explodes -A) in such
a "'LlYth t -A together with A yields everything, total content. The conjunc-
tion A and _A says everything, so everything follows. All-A entails B, for ar-
bi trary and irrelevant B, so the expl.oei.on (or destruction) model: is inevita-
hly paradoxical. The paradoxical character of classical logic for example,
can accordingly be obtained with very few further assumptiors from the charac-
tcr of its negation.
Under weak, and relatively noncontroversial, conditions on other connec-
tives (-,/I,v), the e~)losion model delivers classical negation, according to
'-' -h negation -, is evaluated according to the classical semantical rule
_l_A,a) = 1 if-f I(A,a) f- 1, i.e. A holds at world a iff A does not
hold at a, for every world a (~loyed in the semantic evaluation of entail-
ment). (Under alternative conditions the model yields intuitionistic negation.)
Conversely, classical negation, i .e . negation conforming to the classical rule,
yields the explosion view, since there is no world where both A and -A hold
hut B docs not, whence, on the semantical theory, (4) A/I-A ... B. Thus under
weak conditions the explosion view is that of classical negation.
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Classical negation offers a complete exclusion nodeI of negation, wore pre-
cisely, an exclusion and exhaustion view: for each world a and each statement
A, -A excludes A from holding in a, and -A united with A exhausts a, one or
other must hold in a. The picture is that commonlyoffered for th real worLd
(as e.g. in Hospers, p.212) simply relativised to world a, narreIy
where the ellipse represents the whole of a, all statements of a. "'Not A"will
cover all territory (of a) other than what is covered by "A,,'(p.223).
Quine and many others (e. g. D. Lewis, Copeland) think that classical negation
is "our ordinary" negation and that there is 0 alternative to it, for any al-
ternative would 'change the subject' from negation. Of course they never argue
that it is our ordinary negation; they simply assume that it is. So it is in
Quine's main defence of classical negation, which occurs in a famous passage in
'Deviant Logics' (p.Sl) where he considers two parties, a and B say, who proce-
ed as follows: a, adopting a 'popular extravagance', rejects the law of non-
contradiction and accepts A and -A occasionally. B objects that this 'would vi-
tiate all science' and uses the paradoxes to show that everything would follow
so 'forfeiting all distinctions between true and false'. Party a t r i e s 0
'stave' this off by 'compensatory adjustments', by rigging he logic so as to
isolate contradictions (in good paraconsistent fashion). In Quine's view,
neither party knows what he is talking about. TI1eythink
that they are talking about negation, '-', 'not'; but
surely the notation ceased to be recognisable as negation
when they took to regarding some conjunctions of the form
"p, -p ' as true, and stopped regarding such sentences as
implying all others.
Quine's case is however vitiated by being described in a thoroughly incoherent
(indeed inconsistent) fashion; for example, party B is described as objecting
that 'everything would follow' and as adopting what appears to be the classi-
cal view, yet Quine asserts that 'neither party knows what he is talking a-
bout' because neither adopts the classical view, having just described one of
his disputants as doing so. Nor are Quine's conclusions independently warrant-
ed. The paradoxes of strict implication are not built into the ordinary notion
of negation, into the particle 'not'. The English negation determinable 'not'
is not so determined (as distinct from the classical negation c1eterminate).
Quine has failed to observe the distinction, and has done something which en-
tirely begs the question at issue: equated, without any trace 6f argument,
the natural language 'not' with classical negation. Thus what he goes on to
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claim has no secure basis:
Here evidently lies the deviant logician's predicament:
when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the sub-
ject (p.S1).
There is no predi carrent : the "deviant" may be trying, with more success than
the classicist, to explicate the core notion 'not'. On QUine's viewpoint, no
distinct systems can explicate the same (preanalytic) connectives - which is a
reduction to absurdity of the position. fvbreover, were Quine right no "deviant"
could reject the classical doctrine, he would only be changing the subject.
Yet elsewhere Quine admits (and has to admit on his theory of unrestricted re-
visability (4.1)) the possibility of rejecting the doctrine (e.g. on p.S4, three
pages later):
It is hard to face up to the rejection of anything so ba-
sic [as classIcal negatIon, etc.] If anyone questions the
meaningfulness of classical negation, we are tempted to
say in defense that the negation of any given closed sen-
tence is explained thus: it is true if and only if the giv-
en sentence is not true ... However our defense here begs
the question ... [since] hie use the sane classical 'not'.
/VOl' is it the meaningfullness of classicall negation that is at issue: it is its
correctness, and its uniqueness. The semantical recipe given in explanation
does not separate classical negation from various other negations, e.g. the
relevant negation of II', which [can] satisfy the same recipe. Accordingly, the
recipe does not explain classical negation (without further assumptions, such
as a onc-worLd assumpt i.on) , nor does it show its uniqueness.
Althou~l classical negation is not, unlike connexive negation, a subtrac-
tion operation, a taking Cl1Jay of something already given, it involves certain
subtraction features. By contrast relevant negation does not involve subtrac-
t ion feu tunes; -1\ does not imply the taking away or elimination of A, but adds
. a further condition (although one related to A by certain constraints); -A does
not have enti rely dependent status in the way it does classically. These dif-
ferences arc already reflected in the structure of the complete possible
wor lds of classical logic, as distinct from the worlds of relevant logic. In
the classical case when -A is added to a world, quite a bit may have to be
taken out of the world, e. g. A (and what implies it) if it is there, in order
to cons istcnci =e the wor l d; whereas in the relevant case -A can simply be add-
ed w i thout .uiy cons is tenc i zing subtractions. tvbre generally, worlds can be
simply conn incd and statements added to worlds without the need to delete any-
thing, becauee what is being added are further conditions, not the taking
away of conditions already given. This is the route to a straightforward, and
relevant, theory of counterfactuals (in sharp contrast to the irrelevant clas-
sically-based theori.es which presently dominate the literature(s)).
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3. On the third part of the trichotomous classfication, -A neither cancels
nor explodes A, rather -A constrains but does not totally control A. 111is al-
lows for different positions, including one which will be of especial concern
in what follows, namely relevant negation. Equally as "natural" as th cane 1-
lation model, and muchmore natural than the explosion view of contradiction is
the relevant model, according to which contradictions have exactly th samesort
of inferential status as other types of propositions, that is, they imply sene
propositions and fail to imply other propositions and are subject to the sam,'
laws.
The normal semantical rule for evaluating relevant negation which again is
derivable under modest conditions (see RLR, 2.9), is as follows:
I(_A,a) = 1 iff I(A,a*) ~ 1,
i.e. -A holds in world a iff A does not hold in world a*, the opposite or re-
verse of a. The normal rule, which qeneral.i eee the classical rule, differs from
the classical rule in the ~lrrence of function *, a function which has gener-
ated muo1 discussion. A najor objective in what follows is further explanation
of the * function. It is not difficult to show that negation so evaluated has
the leading properties sought, e.g. A and -A are suitably independent though
nonetheless related; A and -A mayboth fail together and differently both may
hold together; A and -A neither cancel nor implode one another.
It is also not too difficult to indicate how requisite allowance for incom-
plete and inconsistent worlds, both sorts of which are called for in the s~~n-
tical evaluation of inference, leads to the normal rule for negation. Such was
the historical route: given that the paradoxes of strict implication,
(1) AA-A ='> B; and (2) C~ D v -D, are indeed paradoxes and false of enr ai Irrent ,
and that entailment (at the first degree) amounts to truth (or holding) pr s-
ervation over worlds, then their semantical evaluation must al Iow for worlds
where A and -A (strictly A /\ -A) hold but B does not, i.e. for non- tri vial in-
consistent worlds, and for worlds where C holds but neither D nor -0 do, i.e.
for nonnull incomplete worlds. (6) The classical rule has to be rejected. With
only very weak (De ~1Jrgan) conditions on negation, e.g. _(AAB)-<+-A v -B, he
normal (star) rule is inevitable.
To both sum-up and anticipate: the star rule may be variously seen as a
generalization of the classical negation rule, as a generalization that is in-
evitable if inconsistent and incomplete worlds are to be symmetrically allowed
for, as deriving from a general analysis of negation as a certain type of one-
place connective, as a way of reducing a 4-valued picture to a two-valued one
(the AJrerican plan to an Australian one), as a natural reversal operation in
semantic tableaux and in worlds modellings (all these explications are fea-
tured in RLR).
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4. HOW THE MAIN THEORIES HAVE BEEN CONFUSED.
There is much confusion of these three different theories in the modern lit-
erature, much of it engendered by classical logicians' identification of their
negation with "the" real and natural negation. This is responsible for manvgra-
tuitous problems. For example, Strawson thinks that he is giving an aCCOlD1tof
negation which exp Ia.i ns its behaviour in modern logical theory, but he offers
the cancellation account, and then (correctly) arrives at principles implying
Aristotle's thesis which would tri vialize the modern theory.
The first and second views (i .e , 1 and 2) are spectacularly confused in
rindl~y's exposition of Hegel, where neither view is particularly appropriate.
For Findl ay both gives a self-nullifying account of contradictions and also lD1-
critically assumes wi thout any pause a classical explosion view:
,\11 these doctrines [of Hegel's Dialectic] are extremely
hard to stomach, since a contradiction is, for the major-
ity of logical thinkers, a se Lf-nul l i fy ing utterance, one
tha t puts forwaI'd an assertion and then takes it back in
the same breath, and so really says nothing. (7) Andit can
readily be shown that a language system which admits even
one contradiction among its sentences, is also a system
in whi ch anything whatever can be proved ... (p.76)(8).
The l as t cl aun is false, since there are many language systems containing only
iso lat.cd cont radi c t ions ; in particular, systems where contradiction really is
self-nullifying arc comnonl y of this type. Findlay cannot , on his own grounds ,
have it both ways.
Tt is occord ingly not surprising that Findlay is bound to say that Hegel,
whatc vcr he might say, did not mean by 'contradiction' contradiction .
... whatever llegel may say in regard to the presence of
cont rad ictions in thought and reality, the sense iIIwhich
he adrnit s such con t radi ct i.ons is determined by his use
of the concept and not what he says about it... it is
pl ain that he cannot be using it in the self-cancelling
manncr that might at first seem plausible. By the pres-
ence of 'contradictions' in thought and reality, Hegel
plainly means the presence of opposed, antithetical ten-
dencies. :. (p , 77, similarly, p. 193) .
Such is the myth, which is recounted with minor variations, by the majority of
comncntnto rs upon Ilegel. That was not Hegel's position, as riegel emphasized.
J\.~ Findl ay himseIf e l sewhere remarks,
llegel makes it as plain as possible, that it is
watered-doh~ equivocal brand of contradiction,
s t ra ight-Torwa rd head-on contradiction, that he
to exist in thought and the world ... (p.77),
not some
but
believes
not anti thct i.cul or opposed tendencies, etc. To the question of how negation
and contradiction did function on Hegel's logic, the dialectic will return.
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The confusion is not confined to nonlogicians, but appears to orlglnate in
Aristotle. Russell, one of the main architects of classical logic, affords ye
another, and striking example. For in HumanKnowledge: It Scope and Limits>
Russell tries to explain negation: but he outlines (on p.S19) a way of intro-
ducing negation which leads not to classical negation but rather to a relevant
negation (which indicates that even some of those who thought they were arguing
for classical negation have gone astray). Russell links negation ('no ') with
'No'; correspondingly affinnation is linked with 'Yes'. But "Yes" means "Pleas-
ure this way", and "No" "pain that way" according to Russell, whence the cor-
respondences:
Affirmation
Yes
Pleasure, that way (pI)
Negation
No
Pain, that way (pn).
The first thing to observe about such an explanation is that the xpl aining
terms are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. For one phenomenonmayyield neither
pleasure nor pain, another can produce both pleasure and pain. So what Russell's
analogy leads to is not a two-valued picture but a four-valued lattice, with
the following Hasse diagram:
pl,pn where A indicates neither pI nor pn.
pn
Since the negation operation, N say, defined on the lattice (in terms of
pI yielding pn and vice versa) plainly takes us just from top and bottom and
vice versa, the sides being fixed points, upon representing and and or in the
usual way (in the way Russell invariably took them) as lattice join and meet,
what results is a model of relevant logic, specifically of tautological en-
tailment (as presented e.g. in Anderson and Belnap).
For the operations yield at once the following A v - matrices
2 3 4 v 2 3 4 -+- 2 3 4"
1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 1 4 4 4
2 2 2 4 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 4 4
3 3 4 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 1 4
4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 1 1
Upon tiking 1 as the only designated value (a natural choice since it is the
only case of unmixed pleasure, the only clearly desirable element), and upon
defining an implication + by the + matrix above, tautological entailment auto-
matically results. (9) For the above, Smiley matrices, al~ characteristic (see
Anderson and Belnap, p. 161). Nothing Russell goes on to say alters the initial
picture, which he rightly says is 'remote from what the Iogi.cian meansby 'not' .'
But his attempt to fill the intervening steps; to get to what Russell the lo~
ician at least means is simply this:
"not" means something like: "you do right to reject the be-
lief that ... ", And "rejection" means, primarily, a move-
ment of aversion. A belief is an impulse towards some ac-
tion, and the word "not" inhibits this impulse (pp.519-20).
The picture remains four-valued, since the one thing mayboth impel and repel
or may, altemati vely, do neither. The four-valued picture is hardly new,going
back to the ~Egarian logicians. Someof the Stoics tried to reduce the truth
value picture to a three-valued one, discarding the value, both (true and false).
The valued (matrix) picture mayhowever, like the three-valued picture
be reduced to a two-valued worlds picture. The 4-valued matrices can be deri v-
ed from a seman t icaI model with just two worlds: T, the real world or in this
case the pleasure wo r l.d, and T*, its reverse, here the pain world. What is of
importance for present purposes in this semantical analysis of the matrices is
the fact that the negation rule required by the analysis is the star rule, in
the form
I(-A,T)
I (A,T*)
iff I(A,T*) F 1 and
iff I(A,T) F 1, where of course T** T.
,
5. MAIN THEMES CONCERNING TRADITIONAL NEGATION,
ORDINARY AND NATURAL NEGATION, AND THEIR MODELS.
Neither the explosion nor the cancellation view is satisfactory. The exp-
losion view is strongly paradoxical, (10) the cancellation view is weakly para-
llax ical [at least as it stands). The cancellation view does not have each con-
t rad ict ion entailing everything, and all inconsistent theories trivialized in
the IV:J)' that the explosion theory does; but it does have each contradiction
cut a j Iing each other, AA -,\ <-+ BA -B, for arbitrary A and B. For A and -A, and
B emu -B, say exactly the same, .iane Iy nothing. (11) The explosion view is \-ITOng
because contradictions arc not so destructive: there are various different non-
t r ivial inconsi.stent thco r ics . The simple cancellation view is also defective,
since not all contradictions carry the same information: they differ in what
they entail, some of them entailing some things, others other things.
The negation of Hegel's logic, like that of any paraconsistent logic, does
not, and cannot, conform to the classical view 2, nor does it can form to
view 1. (12) For not only did Hegel reject the idea that contradictions could
not be separately thought ('Contradiction is the very moving principle of tl1
world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable', Logic p.
174; cf. too Findlay, p.75 where several references are cited: 'it is absurd
to say that contradictions are unthinkable'); he also certainly held that in
thinking contradictions, one was not thinking nothing, or mere ly a self-cancel-
ling thought; for, quite the contrary, in thinking that Being is identical
with Nothingness and is also not identical therewith, one is thinking an ex-
plici tly contradictory thought of fundarrental importance. While modern para-
consistent theories are usually not as extravagant as 0 the range, type, or
centrality of the contradictions asserted, the intention is much the same:
accounts of negation of type 3 are required.
Before considering in more detail what such negations are like, it is worth
inquiring, and important to inquire -since classical logic is won to claim
that history (as well as God and Truth and Language) is on its side - what tra-
ditional negation, the negation of traditional logic (if there was sud1 a sin-
gle creature) was like. IVhat was the tradition, especially as regards negatio1?
There wasn't a single unified tradition, there were various competing traditions
in particular as to negation and impli cat io.i. These competing positions are es-
pecially evident in the debate as to implication in ancient Alexandria, and in
the controversies of scholastic writings. Despite the competition, there seems,
at least from post-scholastic times, to have been a dominant view, narrely the
cancellation view. (I ~ It should be stressed that this is very much a working
hypothesis. There is a great deal of difficult assemblage of historical evi-
dence still to be accomplished (both for modern and for earlier periods) .(I~
A weaker theme, on somewhat firmer ground, is that the main tiream or dominant
negation of traditional logic is distinctly nonclassical. Some of the evidence
supporting this first working hypothesis will emerge below.
It is also important to inquire what natural negation, negation of natural
language, is like, because part at least of the logical enterprise concerning
negation is to reflect key features of that negation. Again it has been as-
sumed, with precious little evidence, that classical negation fulfils this
role. Many considerations tell against this assumption (see RLR 2 ). It is im-
portant to see through classical negation's pretensions to be the ordinary
normal in tui ti ve notion of natural language and logical thought - compared with
wh i ch alternative n gations such as relevant negation JTlUStbe seen as 'deviant',
'peculiar', 'queer' , abno rma l , contrived, or purely formalistic. Fo r seeing
through its pretensions is an essential part of seeing through classical (im-
plication) theory and seeing why relevant (implication) theory 'should replace
it.
In fact the situation is pretty much the reverse of the conventional pic-
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ture. ReIe vant negation has a better claim to be the (primary) negation deter-
minateof natural language than classical (if indeed there is a unique natural
language negation, which is to be doubted). A second working hypothesis is, then,
that relevant negation is a natural negation. (~, because 'the negation deter-
nrincwle is probably the most comnonly occurring natural language negation; see
further RLR,2.9).
6. NEGATION AS OTHERTHANNESS, AND PROGRESSIVE MODIFICATION
OF THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE.
In order to discuss the traditional idea that negation is otherthanness,
and to consider negation in its historical setting, especially that of the nine-
teenth and earlier twent i.cth century work (when logic began its modern revival),
it is helpful to introduce some of the ideas of Boole and Venn in an exact fash-
ion. Consider, in particular a Boole-Venn interpretation of sentential logic S:
such an interpretation can be extended to other logics, e. g. modal logics. Such
an interpretatIOn J IS a mapping from (initial) wff of S to Vwhich consists of
a composite with (at least two) components, e.g. a geometrical area, a set, a
mereological class, such that the following conditions are met:
H-A) ; V-HA);
j (A& 13) j (A)n j (b) i.e. the commonpart
j(A vB) ; HA) UHB) i.e. the union (of areas).
A wf f C of S is said to be BV-valid iff, for every mapping j, j (C) ; V, i.e. the
inte rpret.at ion is always the whole of V. Then no doubt soundness and complete-
ness maybe established: a wff C is a theorem of S iff it is BV-valid. Further,
assignments under j maybe reduced to assignments for initial wff only, and
the conditions given used to def iru tionally extend the assignments to all wff.
What is of especial interest is however not the fami Liar results but the ren-
dering, or intended interpretation, of function j. There are at least three
overlapping groups of readings:
1. Ceorrct r ical reading with j(A), or IAI as it will sometimes be written,
as what A covers (cf. Hospers above), or the area (or territory) of A.
Z. Set-theoretical readings, with j(A) some set, e.g. the set of cases
where A in true (i.e. the range of A). Set readings are central in the nine-
teenth century theories of complex terms - in the context of which negation
was characte r ist icaLly discussed. For this the wff of S are reconstrued as com-
plex tenns, -A as non-A (e.g. non-animal), AvB as A or 13(e.g. animal or
plant) , etc. Then j(A) is the extension of A, e. g. j fho'rsc ) comprises (all)
horses. While the operations of and and or are relatively straighforward in
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forming complex terms, several logicians were distinctly worried about not and
in fact opted, as we shall see, for a non-Boolean interpretation of not.
3. Propositional readings, where j (A) is some proposition or sun of propo-
sitions. In particular, an obvious j function, exploited be Iow, is that wh i ch
maps each initial wff to the proposition it expresses.
The late nineteenth century view was that negation, whi ch ap; lied to tenns
and also to judgements, is othe rthanness , and on the prevailing view restri cd
othe rthannes s , Thus according to Baldwinvs Encuclopedi.a (p. 147) , ot-A=other
than A - a second thing to A'. But it was not anything other than A. Joseph,
for one, considers the view that 'whatever it (the positive term) be, the neg-
ative term covers everything else' , and rejects it. His conclusion is that
A positive term and its corresponding negative (e.g. blue
and not-blue) may then be said to divide between them not
indeed the whole universe, but the limi ted universe of
things, to which they belong (p. 44fn). (15)
Venn himself acknowledges sudh limits:
It is quite true that we always do recognize a limit, sane-
times expressed but more often tacit, as to the extent over
which not-X is to be allowed to range; and also w not in-
frequently do so in respect of X itself; so long as these
expressions are set before us in words, and not in symbols
only.
Though he continues, 'Between them X and not- Xmust fill up the whole field of
our logical enquiry', he admits restricted fields, and al Iows that we can
dhoose the universe (of discourse) - admissions that run him into se r io us
~rouble where different negative terms call for different restricted fields.
Venn's procedure and the Boolean picture captured in the j - functions the n
break down.
It is by now more or less clear how to repair matters. The picture on the
left gives way to the picture on the right:
V (perhaps restricted) V (unrestricted)
In functional terms it is a little more complex, but again now evident enough.
A further operation * is added to the modelling and the rule for negation a-
mended to:
H-A) j * (A) ,
VA-HA),
i.e. roughly
where VAis the universe as restricted by A.
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Some of the intended properties of * are evident enough, e.g. j** = j, i.e. * is
invo l ut a ry , and on British perceptions j n j* = 1\, i.e. j and j* are always ex-
c I us ive.
To the resulting picture Hegel added, in effect, a ~ignificant liberalizing
clement - one that is forced if contraposition principles (etc.) are to be duly
respected, c spcc ia l l y at the st atement stage - nane ly that exclusiveness is not
always gmr:mteed. 111e reason is, according to Hegel, that for certain A (of
cn tc go r ia: type) j\ = not-A. It is not however necessary to accept, for anything
that fo Ll ows , this difficult doctrine: it would be nearer the mark to say that
h'h:lti S supposed is that there are s ituat ions where A <+ -A, and better to say,
s ti I I. Jess dcmandi npl y , where both A and -A hold. It is enough to say, with Si-
mone de Be:1UVO Lr (p.18) that presence and absence are not mutually exclusive,
or th.i t what !\ covers does not fu l Iy exclude what -A covers. The liberalized
p ict ure which emerges is important:
V (LDlrestricted)
,;iven th.rt j* need not exclude j, the rule j(-A) = j*(A) again suffices (equiv-
.r l cnt Ly , and rove ali ng more structure, j (-A) = v-3 (A) , where 3 is the inverse
or j: sec RLR, 13.5). To glance ahead, we shall simply put The One and The
Othe r back to back, as in a phonograph record, and we will have, more or less,
the sought picture of negation.
7. TRANSPOSING THE HEGELIAN PICTURE: RESTRICTED OTHERTHANNESS,
REVERSAL AND OPPOSITES.
The next t ask LS to transpose the whole business (as prec Iass ica l thinkers
like .Ioscph .i l so tried to do) from the term to the: statement level. The Hege-
li.m picture goes ovc r int act , and what results interpretationally are func-
ti ons c xt cndcd not according to Boolean but according to De Morgan lattice log-
LC (for dc t ai 1s sec Anderson and BeInap , or RLR). 'me negation is no longer
class ic.u , hut relevant.
In t c rms of relevant negation we can see cl as s ical negation as a depauperate
one-dimensional not ion , whi ch forces LIS to consider athernese with respect to
:1 single universe consisting of evc ryth ing . In classical logic negation, -A,
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is interpreted as the universe wi thout IAI, everything in the un.iverso 0 her
than what A covers, as reflected in the Venn di agram:
v
'111esquare V comprises
the universe
The universe CM be interpreted as the sum of propositions. Thus where atomic
wff p is interpreted, naturally enough, as the proposition it expresses, _p
amounts to every proposition in the universe other than the proposition that p ..
Re Ievance problems come straight out of this; for i r re Ievance is wri t ten in
at the bottom. All contradictions have the same interpretation, namely V: h nce
each entails all others Md indeed everything. Paradoxes are inevitable.
It is corollary that -p CaJ1notbe independently identified, it is entirely
dependent on p. This relates, more thaJ1 coincidentally, to alienation (co~)are
what Simone de Beauvoir has to say to alienation of womenwhere 'woman' is i-
dentified as 'other than man"; and is not positively identified, only intro-
duced as alien to the primary notion, 'man'). The negation -A of A is (so 0
say) alien to A.
RelevMt negation CaJ1,however, preserve muchof the othemes notion of
traditional negation (without the counterproductive alienation featu s). But
relevMt Md classical negation differ firstly as regards what the otherness
is considered in relation to. In the case of classical negation i is other-
ness with respect to the universe. In the <ase of re Ievant negation it is
otherness with respect to a muchmore re st r icte d state, such that p and its
negation do not (interpretationally) exhaust the universe between them.
Such a restricted otherness notion is provided by reversal, which gives he
other side of something. The lead side and the other, or opposite, side do no
yield everything, the universe, by My neans , (1") My more than p and -p yield
everything with re Ievant negation. Reversal is in fact a restricted other than
notion - on the other side is not all territory other than p , representing
everything other than p, \\lith reversal otherthanness operates in a re Ievant.Iy-
restricted universe. The reverse direction (or sense) is not any dir c t ion
other than the forward or given one.
TIle reversal picture CM be filled out in several apposite (aJ1dof course
connected) ways,both more superficially syntactically, since in one sense the
reverse of p is _p, and less superficially semantically. Consider first he
debate, 'or dialectical, (l~ model which reveals the type of restricted situa-
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tion with respect to which otherness (the rest of the situation) is assessed .
.\ debate can be represented as the p-issue, or the p-question, when the issue
is as to Mlether p or _po One side asserts, argues, or defends p, the other
side -j>, Or, ;:[5 we say, p and _p are each sides of the issue as to whether p, one
side being the opposite (X or reverse) of the other. The sides are clearly is-
{Jilfi-Y'estricted, and so accordingly is the complementation. To present the case
{or one side, e.g. the posi tave or affirmative, and to present the case for the
other side, the negat ive, is not to present the case for everything, to exhaust
what can be said, etc.
The debate model indicates that classical negation itself carries the seeds
of irrelevance. Thus if one is debating an issue, whether p or -p, classical
negation would al Iow anyth irig at all that wasn't p as relevant to truth of one
hul f. Thus in debnt i.ng say, uranium mining one could introduce say, child care
centres as rc Icvant to one side of case. The notion of relevance is similarly
destroyed, since anythirig confirming anything which is not p is relevant to the
debate. Notions of aboutness, of case, issue, relevance, confirmation and evi-
dcnce , arc all seriously distorted, in a systematic way, by classical negation
(as inclependently shown in much detail in RLRand [22]). The systematic distort-
ion is a result of the restriction to (complete) possible (consistently des-
cr ibabIc) \"0 rlds, a restriction forced by retention of classical negation.
Thero is a simi lar, and similarly forced, distortion of other intensional MC-
tors, e.g. of deontic Functors such as obligation (with respect to mrra.l con-
nict.s) , of psychol ogi cal functors such as belief (with respect to inconsistent
beliefs), etc. etc.
Class ical negation is a depauperate one-dimensional concept which distorts
the functions of natural language and limits the usefulness of the logic it
yields. Class icaI negation may seem natural, firstly because we (or rather sone,
. the brainwashed amongus) have become accustomed to it and perhaps impressed
by its computer applications and arithrretical analogues, and secondly because
(like material irnpl icat ion itself) it captures one dimension of negation, but
it has rejected the other dimensions (e. g. restrictedness). Classical negation
gives a simple account which is a limiting case, but one which, like that of
frictionless surface or perfectly elastic body, does not occur in experience.
8. SEMANTICAL MODELS: WORLDS ON RECORD AND TAPE;
The debate model can be given a nore semantical tum. In the p-issue, -p
i.s asserted, or presented as true, on one side, a say (i.e. a F -p in obvious
notation), while the reverse, namely p , is asserted, or presented as true, on
the opposite side a* (i.e. syrrVolicallya* Fp). Nowone side succeeds in a
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debate, or establishes its case, iff the opposite side does not; therefore
a F -p iff a* FFp. That is, a version of the star rule naturally emerges from
the debate model more semantically considered. Statement _p is made, or presei t-
ed as, true at side or situation a iff p is made, or presented as, true at its
opposite a*.
The debate model leads directly to the record cabinet model. The cabine ,
which can represent the files of the urriverse, is full of records, each record
is an issue, or question, with p on one side and _p on the other side, for eve-
ry atonric p (at least). Fromthis point of view classical negation takes p as
one side of one record, and -p as everything else in the cabinet (classical
theory fails to duly separate issues). Relevant negation takes p as one side
of the record and -p as the other side of the same record, there being many
many records in the cabinet. Note well that intensional functions select apro-
gram from-the cabinet. Such a program may include both sides of a record, and
may include neither side of various records - in contrast to the published
classical picture (the classical picture can be suped-up to avoid the latter
defect but not the former).
The cabinet model maybe differently oriented , Each record, or tape, rep-
resents, e.g. it may just describe, a world, a two-sided world. Then where a
is one side of a world record, or a world, the opposite side is again a*, where
* is the reversal, or flip, function which gives, whichever side one is in on,
the other side. Obviously a** = a, since turning the record over twice takes
one back to the initial position. The semantical rule for evaluating negated
statements is, as for the debate model, the star rule, -p holds at a iff p
does not hold at a*. By contrast, the classical rule quite erroneously iden-
tifies a side with its opposite.
The records maybe ordered or arranged in a way that reflects the rela-
tional structure of (two sided) worlds. The structured record model corre-
sponds exactly to a natural elaboration of Kripke I s valuable sheets-of-paper
model of semantic tableaux for normal modal logics. In explaining alternative
sets Kripke says (63, p.73): 'Informally speaking, if the original ordered set
is diagranrned structurally on a sheet of paper, we copy over the entire dia-
gram twice, in one case putting in addition A in the right column of tableau
t and in the other case putting B; the two new sheets correspond to the two
new alternative sets'. Thus a full construction which consists of a system of
al.te mat.i ve sets corresponds to an arrangement of sheets (a sheaf of sheets).
For relevant semantic tableaux there are only two innovations. First, whereas
with strict implication new related tableaux are introduced one at a time,
with relevant implication new related tableaux are introduced two at a time,
i .e . in pairs. This reflects the replacement of the two-place alternativeness
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relation of modal logics, by the three-place alternatives relation of relevant
logics. The first innovation is not particularly germane to the present issues
(and quasi-relevant systems such as the I sys\ems which require only two-place
relations could be adopted for exposition). Second, and more important, then,
both sides of the sheets are used. (Relevant .logics are conservation-oriented
in that even if rather a lot of sheets are introduced, both sides are used; the
reverses are not wasted as with modal semantical tableaux). The reversal func-
tion * accordingly reverses the page, giving back for front and front for back.
In sum, reversal and opposition have the right properties in leading res-
pects for (the semantics of) relevant negation. Thus the opposite side of some-
Ching is not the removal of the first side or, for example, everything other
than the first side; it is another and further side, which is relatively inde-
pendent of its reverse but which is related to it in a certain way. Both sides
can co-occur (occur simultaneously) in a framework (e.g. controversy) and one
can perfectly well consider both of them. The important point, to say it yet
again, is that one side does not somehow obliterate or wipe out or entirely
eXClude or exhaust its opposite. Nor is the reverse, or opposite, just defined
negatively as the other - it has an independent and equal role on its own be-
half.
There is no mystery then about relevant negation. It is an otherthanness
notion; it has natural and easy reversal models. There is some mystery however
about classical negation, except as an extrapolation, and much mystery as to
why some logicians are tempted to apply it everywhere, especially where, as so
often, it mucks things up. Indeed, given the naturalness of relevant negation
as issue-controlled complementation, versus the unnaturalness of classical~
the naturalness of the reversal notion; and the improved ability of relevant
negation to account for actual intensional functions in natural languages,
relevant negation has a far better claim to be considered the core negation
relation of natural language than classical. So much for the classical claim
to have the only real natural negation and that relevant negation is queer.
APPENDIX 1. HISTORICAL SI DELIGHTS; NEGATION AND CONTRADICTION
IN HEGEL AND HEGELIAN TRADITIONS.
There is not in Hegel a complete and well worked out theory of negation.
There is however much that is suggestive, many mode is , and a clear nonclassi-
cal paraconsistent view. According to Hegel, contradiction occurs both in
thought and in the world. There are true contradictions in nature, as an anal-
ysis of motion shows.
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Somethingmoves, not because it is here at one point of
time and there at another, but because at one and the
same point of time it is here and not here and in this
here both is and is not ([12], II, p.67).'
For details Hegel refers to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Another important class
of true contradictions concerns the categories, which can pass into and be iden-
tical with their opposites. Representing propositional identity as a coentail-
ment, there are truths of the form A++_A. Hegel nicely contrasts his view with
the ordinary view:
Ordinarily. " contradiction, both in actuality and in
thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind
of abnormality or paroxysm of sickness that will soon
pass away ([12J, II, p.67).
Ordinarily too, often enough, contradictions are considered unthinkable. Accord-
ing to Hegel however,
The only correct thing in that statement (that contradic-
tion is unthinkable) is that contradiction does not end
the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when
cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is
only one side of the contrariety ([ 13J, p. 174).
The other side is presumably difference. Although there are elements of a can-
cellation picture both here and elsewhere in Hegel (e.g. [13], p.172 where he
compares positive and negative with + and -, which cancel to zero), he rejects
a cancellation view. He specifically notes ([12], p.S9) that the ordinary view
of contradiction is that it reduces to nothing> like a vacuum(in itself a re-
vealing piece of historical data). But he says ([12], p.70) that we must pass
beyond this one-sided resolution and 'perceive its positive side, when it be-
comes absolute activity and absolute Ground'.
As well as a severely qualified concellation picture, Hegel offers us a
polarity picture of negation, drawn from physics, with Positive and Negative
as polar opposites ([13J, p.174). This polarity picture rapidly leads to a
four-valued model. For some things are both positive and negative, and others
are neither. In short we are back with the lattice Russell's theory leads to:
Havas also claims to find a many-valued logic in Hegel, though what his evi-
dence is is unclear;
... in Hegel' s view in addition to the values "true" and
"false" there is another value, namely, "true and false"
and thi~ is the designated value. So, in this case, the
value ''not-true'' is not identical with the value "false",
since "not-true" means "false, or true and false". If a
proposi tion does not have the value "true", it will have
ei ther the value "false" or the value "true and false".
Propositions having the value "true and false" are ex-
pressions of the actual being of the' things, that is,
their existence in the dynamical states of coming into
being and passing away, and not the mere subsistence of
the things.
Perhaps the most disconcerting things about Hegel's logic are firstly, that
there appears to be no distinction between acceptable and unacceptable contra-
dictions, all being in a way unacceptable, and generating by themselves motion
towards a higher stage in which they are partially resolved, and secondly the
sheer extent of contradiction: 'All things are contradictory in themselves'
([12J, p.66). In later idealists such as Bradley it was insisted that contra-
dictions were manifest in appearance, but not in reality; the Absolute was
claimed to be self-consistent. Hegel's view seems to have been different; the
Abso~utewas inconsistent: 'the sum-total of all realities ends as absolute con-
tradiction' ([12J, p.69).
It is perhaps because of the difficulty of admitting contradictions on SUdl
a grand scale as Hegel does that the Marxist tradition, while retaining the the-
sis of contradictions as pervasive and the source of all movement,watered down
the notion of contradiction.
In Marxist theory, the notion of contradiction degenerates - exceedingly
low redefinitions of 'contradiction' are invoked. This degenerating use of
'contradiction' which is already beginning in Marx's work has becomehighly ad-
vanced in modernMarxism, where 'contradiction' comes to mean simply 'problem'
or '(apparent) conflict' (as often in Mao)or even 'difficulty' (in an Austra-
lian radio broadcast). Just one example from The Trojan Horse:
So far no major breakthrough has appeared that is capable
of rescl.v-ng the contradiction of uneven regional devel-
opment (~. 183, similarly p. 182).
Here the 'contradiction' involves no inconsistency; what there is rather is a
problem which has not been satisfactorily resolved.
APPENDIX 2. AN ACCOUNT OF NEGATION AND CONTRADICTION IN
WITTGENSTEIN'S WORK.
In the earlier work, the Notebooks and especially the Tractatus, Wittgen-
stein runs together, in a way that is ultimately incoherent, exclusion and can-
cellation models of negation. On the one hand, a classical explosion oodel of
negation and classical truth tables for negation are adopted; negation is re-
presented as total exclusion. There has, of course, to be oore to the account
of negation than this. In particular, logical constants such as negation, since
they would othcrwi se raise serious di.ff icul t ics for tile pi cr ure theory of mean-
ing, call for special treatment, which they obtain through the theory of truth-
functions. Negation is simply such a classical function; nothing in rca li t y cor-
responds to it.
But, on the other hand, significant elements of a cancellation picture are
superimposed on the cl assical vi ew. Although the simple parts of cont rad ictions
and tautologies have sense, •the connexions between these JlD ralyse or destroy
one another' c[3SJ,p.117). 'Tautology and contradiction are the limiting cases
-indeed the disintegration- of the combination of signs' ([34],4.466). l'littgen-
stein even says explicitly that 'in a tautology the conditions ... cancel one
another ... • ([34], 4.462), but 'cancel' is applied in a different context from
that where the cancellation vi ew is explained. (What are cancelled, according
to Wittgenstein, are 'the conditions of agreement with the worId"}. The expect-
ed corollaries of a cancellation picture follow, but for tautologies as well as
contradictions: they 'say nothing' (e.g. [34], 6.11) (18).
In later work thi s unstable combination of a hard classical vi ow IV i r h a
cancellation picture is modified and softened in several respects:
1.Negation is not one thing, or one funct ion , Wittegenstein rejects 'the: idea
[of earlier work] that there is somcthing cor.unonto all negation ... , that ne-
gation always has "the same meaning" '([9], p. 540, where these c.lai.ms are ref-
erenced). Wittgenstein now wants to insist that the meaning of negation is not
an object, and not an essence. Rather, what the meaning of negation is is shown
by 'the way it works-the way it is used in the game' ([31], p.SS). The exclusim
model is not abandoned: rather it is assimilated as one amongmany {partial)
models of negation. So it is also \'lith contradiction (which, along with nega-
tion, receives considerable attention in Wit tgens t e.in' slater work) :
... contradiction isn't the unique thing people think it is.
It isn' t the only logically inadmissible form and it is,
under certain ci rcumstance s , admissible (Letters, p.l77)
The no-one-thing theme concerning negation (and derivatively, contradic-
tion) can evi dently be ass irrul at ed under the dct er-ni.nab.le theory of negation
(of [S], 4.3 and RLR2.9). There is not a single negation determinate - and
in this sense, no essence - but many, with classical and conncxi ve negations
as (depauperate, and hardly ideal) Limiting cases. The determinabJ e theory
handles \,e11 lhttgenstein's comparison of _(_p) = p with (--)p = -p, where he
says both that the meaning of negation is not different and that there is some
truth in our inclination to say that' • mustmean something different in the
two cases ([3(;J, p.Sl).
2. fliluchof the remainder of Wittgenstein I s apparently diffuse, and some-
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times incoherent, material on negation and contradiction can similarly be cohe-
rently organized wi thi.n a wi de relevant theory of negation, a theory which has
a classical core but allows for a wide variety of nonclassical language-games
or situations. The key coppespondence in so reorganizing is that between lan-
guage-games on the one side and si tuations OP ioorl de OP - a bit differently -
theor-ies on the other. Language-games can play a quite analogous semantical role
to that played by situations in world semantics (and pragmatics), and indeed,
semanti cal anal yses in t.erms of worlds can be recast in terms of games(19) .
Amongthe normal worlds, comprising class K, of relevant logic, there is a
dis inguished world T, the factu al world, which (on more orthodox accounts) is
exclusi ve and exhaustive, i.e. tre dassical negation rule is satisfied at T, as it
is at the subclass P of K, the complete possible worlds (of modal theory). P
does not e~laust K, since K also contains incomplete worlds, which mayor may
not be possible, and inconsistent worlds. Normalworlds do not of course ex-
haust worlds (i.e., class 11'), they only exhaust the worlds required for the as-
sessment 0 f such notions as deducibility and entailment; but for semantical as-
sessment of 1I10rehighly intensional functors and of connexive logic, abnormal
worlds arc also needed. A precisely analogous picture holds good, in princi-
ple(20), [or language-games; and we shall simply indicate corresponding lan-
guages-games and classes of such games by bar superscripting of corresponding
worlds. Thus, for instance, corresponding to T is the true- false language-game
1'. Also, most important, corresponding to inconsistent and very incomplete
(and so nontrivial) theories in K are fragmentary language-games of K in the
Connof inconsistent calculi (lI'ittgenstein equates calculi with language-games).
Through the difference between l' and other elements of K we can account for
such LICtS as that Wittgenstein does not (in the Lectu ren , for instance) real-
ly get beyond a classical truth-table account of negation (good for elements
of fl), yet says enough to make it clear that that is inadequate, because we
can allow contradictions in systems (cf. [36], p.138) and not admit that every-
thing fol lows (cf. p.243); so contradictions which occur need not trivialise
a ca! culus in the way that they do classically.
'111edistinction between l' and inconsi s tent calculi in K appears in (un-
necessarily) accentuated form in lI'ittgenstein's transitional work (especially
[20]). There lI'ittgenstein separates pure calculi where discourse is not real-
ly propositional from the true-false game, which doe s involve semantical
matters such as tru~h and falsity, and where discourse is propositional (2I) .
lie even seems inclined to suggest that, contrary to appearances, a single no-
t ion oI contradiction does not bridge these distinct areas. Cont.r adi ct ion prop-
er is propositional; 'TIle idea of contradiction ... is that of logical contra-
diction, and this can occur only in the true-false game, that is where wemake
st atcmcnts ' ([20] ,p. 126). What is [o rb i dden in calculi, certain configurations
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such as Hilbert's 0 f 0, sometimes called 'contradictions', should be represent-
ed by 'entirely new sign(s) ... "[he sign Z, say' ([20J, pp.175-6). This doubtful
distinction is in danger of disappearing even where it occurs (as Waissman's
puzzlement about Wittgenstein's position in [20] helps reveal). For Wittgen-
stein also emphasizes that 'a contradiction prope.! and a tautology do not SQ!.'
anything' ([20J, p.531), i ,e. evenin the true-false gane contradictions have no con-
tent, a claim Wittgenstein often equates with the claims he also makes tha t
they have no sense, and do not express propositions, but are only sentences
(d. [36J, pp. 185-6). In this way a propositional role for contradictions which
distinguishes them from symbols like 0 f 0 in perhaps inconsistent calculi is
undermined. Of course a residual distinction could be retained by saying that in
one area the signs are associated with propositions (e.g. their parts express~l
them), in the other area not. But it would not be worth mum. And in any case
the effect of sum a nonproposi tional line on logic, and elsewhere, is devas-
tating (unless a great deal of implausible reinterpretation of proposit ions and
proofs in terms of rules is undertaken). For example, things that figure in
proofs, arguments (sum as from p and -p), beliefs, etc., can no longer figure
because they are not duly propositional. In particular, proofs using reductio
n~thods are fouled up.
In later work, Wittgenstein abandoned the distinction between types of "con-
tradiction" (but by no means entirely the theme that contradictions do not
make sense), and speaks of configurations in calculi as contradictions. It is
calculi with sum configurations (members of W-P), mld their mathematical in-
vestigation that afford the limi ted emancipation from the requirement of con-
sistency predicted by Wittgenstein ([32J , p. 332). There is said to be point in
developing systems in which contradictions can be generated ([ 36J ,pp. 188-9),
and situations, language- games, where there is such point are outlined.
There are then different (sorts of) Language-ganes with respect to contra-
dictions, some such as t where they would be very damaging if they occurred,
and some sum as calculi games where they do occur but without damage. Byway
of different language-games, different procedures in the face of contradic-
tions can be al l owed for. l11US around the theme of different language -games,
many of the pictures and suggestions tried out, often rather inconclusively, in
Wittgenstein' 5 later work, can be organized. The reversal pictures of negation
(d. [36J, p.180), for example, fit immediately into thewiderrelevant framework.
Amongthe pictures tried out are elements that echo lIegel, for instance the
sickness presentation of contradictions, the rejection (late on, e.g. [32], p.
130) of the, unthinkability of contradictions. Wittgenstein was also aware of,
and not entirely unsympathetic to, the Hegel-Parme idean thesis that an ade-
quate description of motion involves contradictions ([32J, V). ButHegel's pro-
gressive transcendence of contradictions (whim are supposed to appear almost
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c vc rywhc rc ) is nor rcpc.ir cd in \\'ittgenstcln, who would, for the most pan, have
II"; s t op at con t r.ul i rt i ons or cnrc fut l y sk irt around them, The sickne,.;s prcscn-
Lit ion i,.; fi lieu nut ill the :,:we [but nor a di sr-asu) Lmaj: of " con rrnd i cti on
([,)11], pp,I,S, 211).\ cont r.rdi cr ion is like a gC'TInin :1, svsr cu, hut it doe s
III,t <how t h.it the wholc svs t cm is d i sca scd . Tn short, n cont r.ul i c r i on in a sys-
11'111 is gCI1l'r;ill,'" h"d thing .uid to be uvo i dcd , but docs not rcvcn l r r i v ia l i t.y .
[11 t hi-. connccri on lvI' .i rc o fIc rcd somcth ing I ike Kricse l t s story reg:lrdlllg Witt-
gc·ll,.;tl'in Oil con t r.ul i cr ion : - .icco rdi ru; to Krics c l , wit t gcns rc i n ' s rule is : On
C'IIColultcring" con t r.rd i ct ion , St.op ' There a ro IlI:JJlifold troubles w ith this con-
ncx i ve style rule (brought out in [22], pp.17')-80), and it should be rejected .
.\101' it i,.; so cl ca r t.h.rt \\ittgl'nsteill would have accepted it. 1\~lot IVittgcnstein
docs s"y concc rn i.ng finding :1 con t rndi cti on In ;1 sys tcm is that 'the contradic-
tion does not even falsify anyt h ing . l.ct it lie, Do not go there' ([36J ,p.138).
This approach is unsat is fact ory. 1:0r - cont ra ry to Wit tgens te in , who assumes
that usefulness impl i.cs no contradictions ([32J ,p.104), that where a calculus
h"s :1 usc contr~diction h",.; to he- forestalled (cf. [9J ,1'.272) - we may 'vant to
I,,;·; tile contraui,ction to ShOlvsignificant things about a system. And we won't
,v:mt to Jlersist ,,,ith :I Sl'stClll "Inch proves trivial (as Wittgenstein occasional-
lyadmits, [30],1'.243).
3. II cancc Llation vi ehl, str ietly incompatible Ivith the classical theory of
the T.i',ldatl',J, is incrc~:lsingly infiltrated in subsequent work. A cancellation
picture is alreaJy much deployed in transitional hlork, e.g. 'the rules of Eucli-
uean geometry uon't contradict one another, i.e. no rule occurs which cancels
out ::m'earller one (p and -p), .. ' ([31J,p.345). It is such a cancellation pic-
ture, I"here (as in the Tl"ClCI:crtuc) contradictions have no content and say nothing,
emu so are llseless, that lies behind Wittgenstein's assW1!ptions that me should
not dra\V an!) conclusions from a contradiction ([ 36] ,p. 220), or better, that a
I"ay should be fOlnu of not proceeding from a contradiction ([36J ,p.223). But
both :lssumptions arc inadequate, because often one needs, or wants, to proceed
from a cont radiction: some contradictions are very useful.
Very many 0 f the picturcs and images of negation Wittgenstein later consi-
uers arc of a GUlcellation type or can be adjusted to fit a cancellation modeL
i\lthough \'Iittgenstein repeatedly alludes to such images, at the same time he
depreciates them (e.g. all attempts to explain ,.hy a contradiction "'Jon· t
work" are spurious, [36] ,p.xviii): they are all said to convert to no more
than suhst ltution of one symbol ism for another. Even so, such things can
have ;m explanatory and modelling role. Wittgenstein suggests not, because all
that is of fered is symbol ism and figure, so the question of 'how one is goi ng
to usc It'" ([36J ,1'.181) remains, since any picture can be llsed in several \Vays.
lIe goes on to eluvance the even more dubious description theme t)lat 'anything
227
which we give and conceive to be an explanation of why a contradiction does no
work is always just another way of saying that we do not want it to work' ([36J,
p. 187).
The assumption that contradictions don't or won't, work and associated
themes, e. g. that contradictions are useless, and associated images, etc. the
jammingpicture ([36] ,pp. 187-9, ascribed to ~bore, p. 190), are all connexivist
in cast. With a contradiction, as when the cogs jam, nothing emerges, 'we can-
not do anything with it' ([36] ,p.191) -, It is from the sane cancellation nodeI
that the no- content thesis, which jammingdepicts , derives that contradictions
do not say anything, a thesis also equivalently (but misleadingly) expressed
in 'contradictions don't make sense'.
The cancellation view can be included in the relevant synthesis by appeal
to abnormal worlds or Language-ganes , ganes where contradictions do stop pro-
ceedings, and where A!I~Amay have no content. But in assuming, as he often ap-
pears to, that games are r~stricted to those that are classical (effectively,
in P) or those that are of a cancellation type (in a subclass of W-K), Wittgen-
stein much too drastically delimits the games, or worlds, needed in giving a
full account of negation. And in assuming that abnormal cancellation-type garres
are characte ri st ic - 'that we exclude the contradiction and don't normally give
ita meaning is characteristic of OUT whole use of language' ([36J ,p. 179) -
Wittgenstein goes curiously astray. Conunonlywe do not treat contradictions in
this way. Wereason on the basis of them (e.g. in reductio arguments), we act
on the basis of inconsistent information (cf. the general who acts, and succe-
eds, on the basis of contradictory reports [36] ,po105), we exploit paradoxes
when we can, etc.
*
NOTES.
Joseph fails to escape the difficulty though he makes two attempts, con-
tending (falsely): 1- that 'there is always a positive character as ground
of a negation', 2 - 'that A is not B means that it is different from B and
not that it is non-existent'. Both routes have since been followed through,
and found wanting.
Sartre is firmly entrenched (like the early Russell) in a levels-of-exis-
tence doctrine (see, e.g., p.7, middle).
This assumes - what is not unreasonable, but strictly calls for futher argu-
ment - that the inner and outer negations are the same.
Assumed, for the tin~ being, at least, is a metatheory for the semantics
that can be interpreted classically: cf. RLR,3.2.
Quine's position on "deviant" logics is inconsjsten~. As Gochet.
points out (in chapter 7, Section 7), Quine as vaci Llated between a.1lb-
eral position, according to which every statement, Incl~dlng any. lOgIcal
l aw, is open to revision, and an incompatible conserva~r~e posit i.on (re-
flected in the previous quotation from p. 81) where revi sion becomes im-
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possible, any change in logical principles being ascribed to changes in the
meanings of constants. Quine's later attempt to resolve the matter ( in
Roots of Reference) and admit limited revisability, not only leads beyond
the confines of truth-functional logic (to three-valued and indeed inten-
sional logic), but is, so Gochet argues, untenable.
(5) IVhere the classical account is not the crude (but persistent) view that the
material-conditional represents 'if ... then', it is a classical-based mod-
al theory in the fashion of Stalnaker and others (see, especially, Harper,
Pearce and Stalnaker). Both types are criticised in RLR, where the rudiments
of an alternative relevant account are also presented. The philosophical
basis of the relevant account is explained in Routley (unpublished).
(&) There are independent arguments, presented in RLR, 2, that A and v semantic-
al rules do not change from orthodoxy.
(7) Similarly below, 'contradictions ... condemn (us to) wholesale dumbness',
'it is the mark of a self-contradictory utterance that it describes nothing
whatever', etc. Compare also p.25 where self-nullifying is explained in
terms of taking back what has been put forward so as to leave nothing stand-
ing.
(8) 'So', Findlay continues, p.76,
"the whole of such a system becomes self-nullifying, and
infected with contradiction".
TIle attempt to connect the different cases by the use of 'self-nullifying'
fails: for a system is self-nullifying, or rather self-defeating, in saying
too much, in being trivial, whereas an utterance is self-nullifying in say-
ing too little, zero.
(9) Alternatively, rnl different grounds both 1 and 2 may be designated, and a
different implication matrix adopted with the same result: see RLR, 2.
(1~ That is only symptomatic of the range of things that is wrong with it, on
which see RLR, 1.
(10 Strictly there are different positions here depending on whether contradic-
tions are said to imply themselves or not, i.e. whether A + A holds quite
generally or not. If not, as with peripatetic logics, weak paradox can be
avoided. But then many other problems arise: see RLR, 11. An alternative,
sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein, is to say that contradictions lead
nowhere, that all argument stops when a contradiction is encountered. Ps to
hOI' unsatisfactory this view is, see [22J pp. 179-80. Moreover, on Wittgen-
stein's view, contradictions may stand in some language games. They are not
always destructive or self-cancelling.
,(12) The theme that Hegel's logical theory is a paraconsistent one will be ar-
gued elsewhere, as will the theme that contradictions in Hegel's theory are
genuine contradictions.
(1~ Where does Hegel fit in? Hegel seems to have realized that he was doing
something different from traditional logic, that he was in a sense outside
of (and extending)the tradition.
(10 We should be grateful to anyone who supplies historical leads to pursue.
The situation is much complicated in the case of scholastic logicians by
the selection of work that has so far been made available -which typically
tries to see these people as anticipating modern established doctrine, the
conventional classical wisdom, rather than as investigators of various al-
ternati ve logic options. The bias ,of history impedes research of altemati v-
es, 50 to say. Fortunately that situation may be beginning to change espe-
cially with new research into the obligationes-literature.
(15) Joseph elaborates his view through examples such as I intemperate', 'uneven'
and 'not-blue', e.g. the latter is equated with 'coloured in some way
other than blue' (italics added). More generally, not-A will signify what
a subject, which might be A, will be if it is not A' (p.43).
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(16) Otherwise there would be room for only one record company, and only one re-
cord from it.
(17) In one of the historical senses of 'dialectical'. A debate can al. 0 be 'dia-
lectical' in the other histor~cal sense; for one side maydefend both q and
-q. A related model lS the eui denae model, where one side is the evidence
for p, the other the evidence for -p ,
(18) It is possible to define a (highly artificial) notion of content which makes
some elements of such corriJinations of classical and cancellation views'work
for instance thus: where A is analytic ct(A) = 0, and where A is not analyt~
ic ct(A) is defined in a standard way, e.g. in terms of consequences of A
or through the class situations where A does not hold. But then content '
loses its usual (normic) connections, e.g. the ties with consequence are se-
vered, and the logical behaviour of content becomes highly irregular.
L. GOIdstein persuaded us that some of Wittgenstein's early work involved
a cancellation view.
(19) As explained in detail in [8J ,7.2. In effect the correspondence is also ap-
plied, in different ways, by Lorentzen and Hintikka, where the analogies
with game theory are also exploited.
(20) There are some (hardly insuperable) problems in describing maximal Iy con-
sistent language -games.
(21) This sharp contrast, and double role for contradictions, is repeatea in Ha-
llett (p.221), again based partly on transitional work. IVherepropositions
say something, describe something ([20] ,po106), a contradiction is alarming.
'For there can be no contradiction in reality (i .e. T) our description must
be wrong'. By contrast, contradictions need not be alarming in mathematics
(in K-P). 'But mathematics is always a machine, a calculus. The calculus
describes nothing. It can be applied to that to which it can be applied'.
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